By K.R. Howe
This publication is exclusive within the sweep of concerns it considers and how it integrates them below one basic philosophical point of view. very important studying for philosophers of schooling, academic researchers and social technological know-how methodologists.
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Additional info for Closing Methodological Divides: Toward Democratic Educational Research (Philosophy and Education)
Neither dogmatic adherence to the positivistic pipe dream nor chaotic methodological relativism (let alone the two, side by side) promise to advance educational research. The way out of this dilemma is to give up the notion that social research must be either just like physical science or fundamentally different from it. The incompatibility thesis ignores this possibility because, to borrow again from Kaplan (1964), it confuses “two things to understand” (intentionalist and nonintentionalist) with “two kinds of understanding” (scientific and interpretive).
I deplore, but I find myself best able to express my disapproval through retaining the old-fashioned construct of truth, warnings against individually and clique selfish distortions, and a vigorously exhorted fact/value distinction . . (p. 125) 24 CLOSING METHODOLOGICAL DIVIDES [The] effort to make us aware of biased-paradigm co-optation is again one best done by retaining a traditional fact/value distinction; it is a matter of becoming selfcritically aware of our profoundly relativistic epistemological predicament and using this awareness in the service of a more competent effort to achieve objectivity, rather than employing it to justify giving up the goal of truth, (p.
Further—and this is the crucial point—unless the answer is “both,” it is not the sort of term that will do us much good in social science, (pp. 195–196) The view exemplified by Scriven and Rorty holds that social science concepts are neither descriptive nor evaluative per se, but are two-edged—the distinction between description and evaluation depends on the contexts in which concepts occur. Value judgments may not be excluded from the arena of rational criticism in general or from the conduct of research in particular.